Civic space—and desire—deranged: from Le Corbusier to Georges Perec by Marcus, Doel
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
Civic Spaces and Desire
                                      
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa50560
_____________________________________________________________
 
Book chapter :
Doel, M. (2019).  Civic space—and desire—deranged: from Le Corbusier to Georges Perec. Civic Spaces and Desire,
(pp. 20-37). London:  Routledge.
 
 
 
 
 
 
Released under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license (CC-BY-NC-
ND).
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ 
  CIVIC SPACES 
AND DESIRE 
 Edited by  Charles Drozynski  and Diana Beljaars 
First published 2020
ISBN: 978-0-8153-9523-2 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-8153-9526-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-351-18413-7 (ebk)
1
CIVIC SPACE—AND
DESIRE—DERANGED
From Le Corbusier to Georges Perec
Marcus A. Doel
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
1
CIVIC SPACE— AND 
DESIRE— DERANGED 
From Le Corbusier to Georges Perec
Marcus A. Doel
“Our space has strange effects. For one thing, it unleashes desire.” (Lefebvre, 
1991, p. 97)
“There is desire only if it is desire for the machine.” (Guattari, 2006, p. 184)
“. . . what? . . . the buzzing? . . . yes . . . all the time the buzzing . . . so- called . . .” 
(Beckett, 1984, p. 220)
The titular phrase “civic spaces and desire” reminds me of the opening lines of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s wonderful book, Kafka: Toward a Minor Litera-
ture: “How can we enter into Kafka’s work?” they ask. “This work is a rhizome, 
a burrow. . . . We will enter, then, by any point whatsoever; none matters more 
than another, and no entrance is more privileged even if it seems an impasse, a tight 
passage, a siphon” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 3). How, then, can we enter 
the burrow or rhizome of civic spaces and desire? Besides the city gates, the main 
thoroughfares and the subterranean watercourses, the obvious points of entry are 
“civic spaces” on the one hand and “desire” on the other hand, but I hesitate to 
choose between them since it is not entirely clear which of them should come first, 
nor whether they are in fact even separable. My hesitation leads me to reread the 
opening lines of Le Corbusier’s foreword to his seminal text The City of Tomorrow 
and Its Planning, penned in 1924, with an eye towards the stirring of civic spaces 
and desire:
A town is a tool. Towns no longer fulfil this function. They are ineffectual; they use 
up our bodies, they thwart our souls. The lack of order to be found everywhere in 
them offends us; their degradation wounds our self- esteem and humiliates our sense of 
dignity. They are not worthy of the age; they are no longer worthy of us.
(Le Corbusier, 1947, p. 13, italics in original)
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This foreword— where towns thwart, offend, wound, degrade and humiliate 
our efficacy, our dignity, our bodies, our worth and even our souls— is prefaced by 
an aerial photograph of “a typical London suburb” that Le Corbusier admonishes 
with the words: “A charming picture which displays every vice of planning!” (Le Cor-
busier, 1947, p. 12, italics in original). Having foreshown his readers what is unde-
sirable about extant civic space, Le Corbusier goes on to argue that the “City of 
Tomorrow” must be built anew according to what has been proper to Man since 
the advent of Homo Erectus— the straight line and the right angle, which are not only 
“sane and noble” and “the result of self- mastery”, he says (Le Corbusier, 1947, 
p. 30), but that are also truly sublime, especially when arranged to form crosses and 
iconostases, as in his own 1955 Poem of the Right Angle (Le Corbusier, 2012)— and 
which must erase the degraded, unworthy and ignoble “City of Today” that has 
emerged over millennia according to what is fundamentally alien to Man and only 
really fitting for beasts of burden: the crooked and errant “path of least resistance” 
(Le Corbusier, 1947, p. 23), whose disorderly and irrational topographic meander-
ing he dubs the pack- donkey’s way.
Man walks in a straight line because he has a goal and knows where he 
is going; he has made up his mind to reach some particular place and he 
goes straight to it. The pack- donkey meanders along, meditates a lit-
tle in his scatter- brained and distracted fashion, he zigzags in order to 
avoid the larger stones, or to ease the climb, or to gain a little shade; he 
takes the line of least resistance. . . . The Pack- Donkey’s way is respon-
sible for the plan of every continental [European] city; including Paris, 
unfortunately.
(Le Corbusier, 1947, pp. 23– 24)
Now, I wager that the phrase “civic space” will bring out the more or less latent 
geometer and geomancer in you, probably under the pretext of enforcing law and 
order, if only for the reason that “space lays down the law because it implies a 
certain order— and also a certain disorder” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 143). Even a barely 
trodden desire line or desire path lays down the law and commands bodies, as 
Robinson Crusoe discovered to his fright when he stumbled upon a man’s solitary 
footprint on the sandy shore of his supposedly desolated and deserted Island of 
Despair:
I stood like one thunderstruck, or as if I had seen an apparition. . . . [A]fter 
innumerable fluttering thoughts, like a man perfectly confused and out of 
myself, I came home to my fortification, not feeling, as we say, the ground 
I went on, but terrified to the last degree, looking behind me at every two 
or three steps, mistaking every bush and tree, and fancying every stump at a 
distance to be a man.
(Defoe, 1791, unpaginated)
22 Marcus A. Doel
Indeed, “nothing and no one can avoid trial by space— an ordeal which is the 
modern world’s answer to the judgement of God or the classical conception of 
fate” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 416). However, in these more fluid, flexible and flaccid 
of times, I suspect that the geometer and geomancer in you will be less fixated on 
the nobility of the straight line and the right angle, or the dignity of the square and 
the cube, than Le Corbusier was wont to do:
a modern city lives by the straight line, inevitably; for the construction of 
buildings, sewers and tunnels, highways, pavements. The circulation of traf-
fic demands the straight line; it is the proper thing for the heart of a city. The 
curve is ruinous, difficult and dangerous; it is a paralyzing thing. The straight 
line enters into all human history, into all human aim, into every human act.
(Le Corbusier, 1947, p. 28)
After all, having debased, disgraced and dishonoured the straight line, the square 
and the cube, the onto- aesthetic taste of today seems to be much more curvaceous, 
rambling and feral; a derangement well- illustrated by the superimposition of the 
ludic Parc de la Villette on the post- industrial ruins of Baron Haussmann’s original 
City of Blood (Claflin, 2008; Tschumi, 1994), or even by the sweeping loops of the 
railway system that Le Corbusier somewhat incongruously proposed for his other-
wise rectilinear City of Tomorrow:
It is 9 am. From its four vomitories, each 250 yards wide, the station dis-
gorges the travellers from the suburbs. The trains, running in one direction 
only, follow one another at one- minute intervals. . . . The station square is so 
enormous that everybody can make straight to his work without crowding 
or difficulty. Underground, the tube taps the suburban lines at various points 
and discharges its passengers into the basements of the sky- scrapers, which 
gradually fill up. Every sky- scraper is a tube station.
(Le Corbusier, 1947, pp. 193– 194).
Now, given the arrangement of the phrase civic spaces and desire, one may be 
forgiven for thinking that civic spaces should come first and desire second, as if the 
first- mentioned were our primary concern and the latter only insofar as it bears on 
the former: Civic Spaces— and Desire, as it were; where the “— and Desire” arrives 
belatedly as an afterthought or an after- effect, in keeping, perhaps, with the con-
viction that “man governs his feelings by his reason” (Le Corbusier, 1947, p. 23). 
We could then begin to enumerate and explore all of the ways in which desire 
may come to affect civic space. But what is desire? Understood naively, desire is 
the desire of a subject (as cause, origin, agent, truth and measure) for an alluring object 
(real, symbolic or imaginary). Such a desire is always in excess (and therefore both 
luxuriant and gratuitous) of so- called “needs” (i.e. necessities, use- values) on the 
one hand and so- called “wants” (i.e. decencies, sign- values) on the other hand, 
even when the desirable Thing is lacking, like a sinkhole, and precisely because it 
is lacking, like an aporia. A more refined understanding of desire would regard it 
as an insatiable, interminable and self- referential process of prolongation and pro-
crastination that perpetually differs and defers (i.e. desire desires desire— not satisfac-
tion, not fulfilment, not attainment, not completion, each of which would be fatal 
to desire and anticlimactic; but perpetuation, augmentation and intensification), 
or even as the desire for conscious or unconscious recognition— “the desire for a 
desirer” (Lacan, 2014, p. 24), the “desire for the desire of an another” (Macey, 
2000, p. 95) and “the desire of the Other” (Lacan, 2008, p. 38)— that necessarily 
entails anguish and misrecognition (in short, the desire for desire). However configured, 
desire would come— belatedly, like a laggard— to affect civic space: from the inside 
out and the outside in. From the inside out in terms of specifically civic desires that 
find themselves expressed in civic space, such as those grandiose monuments and 
memorials that sprout up in public space, like Pyramide du Louvre, Arc de Triom-
phe de l’Étoile and La Grande Arche de la Défense in Paris. And from the outside 
in in terms of all of those other desires that would find themselves “out of place”, so 
to speak, in civic space, as evidenced, for example, by the proliferation of all man-
ner of more or less petty prohibitions, such as against ball games, skateboarding, 
loitering and other incivilities (e.g. spitting, smoking, littering, urinating, honking, 
heavy petting and suchlike). By folding the inside out and the outside in, civic 
space and desire would be like the unfathomable, invaginated house in Robert 
Coover’s short story, Playing House:
Once there was a house, the storyteller continues, which was struck by a 
hurricane and turned inside out, the outside closed within it, its own dimen-
sions infinite and unknowable at what was once the core, more like the 
edge. Those within moved out, which of course was further in, and there 
they built a new house looking out in all directions upon the inverted old. 
Over time, they enlarged the house and as they added rooms, the old house 
gradually backed away and faded out of sight.
(Coover, 2005, p. 65)
In short, given any civic space whatsoever, one could enumerate all of the desires 
that could sweep over it, whether civic or not, and consider how they may affect 
and be affected by one another. Such an encounter between civic space and desire 
would play out like the “pure machinic filiation” (Guattari, 2006, p. 180) of the 
alluring orchid and the perverted wasp, each de- territorialising and re- territorialising 
the becoming of the other through solicitation, penetration and transformation. (For 
example, what became of Place de Grève following the arrival of the guillotine 
in 1792, and of the guillotine during its sojourn to Place de la Révolution for the 
Reign of Terror or even during its confinement to the penal “Houses of Horror” of 
Nazi Germany?) Naturally, some of these desires would sweep in from the side (i.e. 
from the realm of everyday life) or swoop down from above (i.e. from a would- be 
transcendent realm that would lord over everyday life), but many of these desires 
would surge up from below (i.e. from the “infra- ordinary”, as Georges Perec (1999) 
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dubbed it). Beneath the paving stones lies the beach, as the famous revolutionary slogan 
from May ’68 poetically expressed the liberation of desire from under the yoke of 
capitalism and its stooges (teachers, parents, preachers, cops, bureaucrats, politicians, 
etc.); but beneath the beach lies the magma of the collective unconscious that peri-
odically finds its mob expression: Civic Spaces (— and Desire), so to speak (Badiou, 
2012; Bloom, 2012; Ross, 2008). I am reminded of James Cauty’s A Riot in a Jam Jar 
(2011), a series of 1:87 scale dioramas of riotous moments and public order overkill 
displayed within upturned jam jars.
Now, while one may be forgiven for thinking that civic space should come first 
and desire second, one may also be forgiven for thinking the converse, since desire 
was obviously in play long before the emergence of civic space, and indeed long 
before the emergence of any civility whatsoever. Civic space would be the expres-
sion, the repression or the perversion of certain more or less primordial desires, 
such as topophilia (a love of place) or topophobia (a hatred of place), for example, 
which have echoed down the ages. Desire would then be under the cosh of civility 
and under the cloche of civic space, and civic space would be a space of domesti-
cated desires: tamed and docile; enslaved and servile; law- abiding and customary; 
cold and drab. Whence the continual need to revivify civic space with statues and 
fountains, banners and bunting, and pomp and ceremony. But all of this will have 
been in vain.
Order and civility, then, would not so much flow from the outside in, dissipat-
ing in the fragmentary space of the utterly chaotic, but would rather surge from 
the inside out: atomistic, cellular and modular. Here as elsewhere, the Devil is 
in the detail: doors, windows, handrails, handles, baths, lighting, worktops, etc. 
Indeed, Flora Samuels (2007, p. 1) argues that nowhere is Le Corbusier’s “desper-
ate attempt to create order in what he perceived to be a fragmented and chaotic 
world . . . better expressed than in the realm of detail”. Le Corbusier’s buildings 
were equipped rather than furnished. For example, equipment for dwelling— such 
as sinks, showers, staircases and storage— enable a house to function as a “machine 
for living”. While many have since recoiled from such a seemingly cold machine, 
Le Corbusier warmed to its touch. And yet, such a space of quelled desire would 
no doubt remain haunted by the return of the repressed— wild, unbroken and 
unbridled desire. For when we speak of civic spaces and desire I wager that the 
first thing that is called to mind is a more or less violent outburst that shatters the 
ostensibly serene order of things, from the delirium of spirited haranguers on so 
many makeshift plinths to the uproar of riotous mobs surging through the streets— 
although I would stress that these spasmodic outbursts are often conjured up and 
orchestrated by the state and its stooges. After all, those cobbled streets that yearned 
to be torn up and hurled at the police during May ’68 did not pave themselves. 
Nor did those lamp posts that ached to be transmogrified into impromptu gallows 
(“à la lanterne!”) for the execution of popular (or street) justice during the French 
Revolution of 1789 illuminate themselves.
Whether one enters the burrow of civic spaces and desire from the side 
of civic space or from the side of desire, one will sooner or later stumble 
over the seemingly innocuous “and” that comes between them, a conjunc-
tion that gathers them up, spins them around and carries them away: and . . . 
and . . . and . . . We are not, after all, considering “civic spaces of desire”, 
but “civic spaces and desire”. Now, this seemingly innocuous and can be put 
to work and made to resonate in a great many disparate registers, including: 
progression (better and better), causation (and then), great duration (on and on), 
great number (more and more), addition (this and that), differentiation (there are 
spaces and there are spaces), variety (X and Y) and succession (move two and two). 
Whence the need for “a hinge- logic, a hinge- style” (Lyotard, 1990, p. 123) 
to articulate and express such a heterogeneous and disjointed multiplicity: for 
example, by way of the folds of dialectics (“V”), the chiasma of deconstruc-
tion (“X”) or the schizzes of schizoanalysis (“Z”). Hereinafter, civic spaces and 
desire slide and glide, like pivoting windows and revolving doors, on these 
and other hinges— and that leaves geography unhinged and deranged (Doel, 
1996, 1999).
This conjunction [“and”] carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb 
“to be” [“is” and “is not”] . . . The middle is by no means an average; on the 
contrary, it is where things pick up speed. Between things does not designate 
a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but 
a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one and the 
other away.
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 25, italics in original)
Suffice to say that an and is my preferred mode of entry into the burrows of 
the real, the symbolic and the imaginary. Such an and does not so much conjoin 
two discrete positions, least of all as an integral, but halves them together and 
hollows them out, as parasitical differentials that “repeat to differ” in an eter-
nal return (Deleuze, 1994). Begin to tilt or twist or revolve the bar between 
civic spaces and desire and you may begin to get a sense of what I mean: civic 
spaces/ desire. What returns by way of the slash is neither the same terms nor the 
same difference between terms, but difference as such, or différance: differing and 
deferring without origin or end, like the facing off of mirrored skyscrapers in 
Paris La Défense. Richard McGuire’s graphic novel Here (2014), which presents 
a labyrinth of time cut up in situ, is a perfect rendition of this hinge- logic and 
hinge- style. The plurality of civic spaces would seem to lean in this direction 
of dissemination and differentiation. Likewise with the insatiability of desire. 
Desire stutters and stammers, driven by an insatiable demand: and . . . and . . . 
and . . . “Desiring connection works from term to term, and ‘forgets’ each as it 
goes” (Guattari, 2006, p. 30, italics in original). “Where are you going? Where 
are you coming from? What are you heading for? These are totally useless ques-
tions” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988, p. 25). Since no one truly belongs— belongs 
as such— to civic space, rather than getting lost in the fabric of the city we are cast 
adrift in the city. “Voyage in place”, quip Deleuze and Guattari (1988, p. 482). 
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As for space, which is spaced out and splays out, it also consists of nothing but 
ands, just as space– time consists of nothing but ands and buts. Accordingly, when 
I first encountered the phrase “civic spaces and desire” I was immediately struck 
by its innumerable perforations, its endless openings and its interminable slid-
ing: civic spaces and desire = and . . . and . . . and . . . and . . . and . . . and . . . 
and. “We will enter, then, by any point whatsoever. . . . Only the principle of 
multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and 
those attempts to interpret a work that is actually only open to experimentation” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1986, p. 3). For “if it’s true that all desiring connection 
is revolutionary and subversive . . . then analysis opens up onto another world” 
(Guattari, 2006, p. 151). Such is the force of schizoanalysis, which “follows the 
machinic indices of deterritorialization” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 3). Eve-
rything is uprooted and swept away in the revolutionary slipstream of and . . . 
and . . . and . . .
One key advantage of cleaving to the hinge- logic and hinge- style of the and is 
that it frustrates the tendency to delimit in advance what will and will not count 
as civic space, and what will and will not be given over to desire. It also nimbly 
sidesteps the vexed question of the difference between space and place, their rela-
tionship to time (pace, pas) and their qualification as civic. I wager that any attempt 
to taxonomise civic space will prove inexhaustible and engender a “perfectly 
astonishing miscellaneity” (Perec, 1999, p. 196), much like the “mind- boggling 
enumeration” of animals that Perec gleaned from a small selection of French gov-
ernment documents and associated legal texts:
(a) Animals on which bets are laid, (b) animals the hunting of which is 
banned between 1 April and 15 September, (c) stranded whales, (d) animals 
whose entry within the national frontiers is subject to quarantine, (e) animals 
held in joint ownership, (f) stuffed animals, (g) etcetera (this etc. is not at 
all surprising in itself; it’s only where it comes in the list that makes it seem 
odd), (h) animals liable to transmit leprosy, (i) guide- dogs for the blind, (j) 
animals in receipt of significant legacies, (k) animals able to be transported 
in the cabin, (l) stray dogs without collars, (m) donkeys, (n) mares assumed 
to be with foal.
(Perec, 1999, p. 197, parenthetical remark in original)
I will leave you to list, more or less exhaustively, all of the species of civic space 
that will ever have existed— intensively and extensively, virtually and actually, in 
the real, symbolic and imaginary registers, etc.— , starting with an oaken crown 
(corona civica), perhaps, and ending with a non- human or post- human democratisa-
tion of the polis to encompass those “poor in world” (e.g. animals and plants) as 
well as those “without world” (e.g. stones and rocks), and to ponder where the 
foregoing civic arrangement of animals should appear in the list, along with this 
civic arrangement of plants by the Nazis in the Auschwitz (Birkenau) death camp, 
which I am tempted to call a necropolis rather than a metropolis since it was a city of 
extermination and a regime of horror and terror (Gutman and Berenbaum, 1994; 
Sofsky, 1997; Wachsmann, 2015).
6 November 1943
Objective: to assemble the plants for the purpose of providing a border of green-
ery for the camp’s Nos 1 and 2 crematorium ovens.
Ref: Conversation between SS- Obersturmbannführer Höss, Camp Com-
mandant, and Sturmbannführer Bishoff.
 To SS- Sturmbannführer Ceasar, Head of Agricultural Services in the 
Concentration Camp of Auschwitz (Upper Silesia).
 In conformity with an order from SS- Obersturmbannführer Höss, 
Camp Commandant, Nos 1 and 2 crematorium ovens in the camp 
will be provided with a green border serving as a natural boundary to 
the camp.
 The following is a list of the plants needing to be drawn from our 
stocks of trees:
 200 trees in leaf from three to five metres high; 100 tree shoots in leaf 
from a metre and a half to four metres high; lastly, 1,000 bushes for use 
as lining from one to two and a half metres high, all to come from the 
stocks in our nurseries.
 You are requested to place these supplies of plants at our disposal.
Head of the Central Building Directorate of
the Waffen SS and the Police at Auschwitz.
Signed: SS- Obersturmführer
(Quoted in Perec, 1999, pp. 90– 91)
I mention these seemingly incongruous civic spaces of animals and plants to 
forestall any overly hasty delimitation of civic space, particularly with respect to 
orderliness, reasonableness, progressiveness, urbanity and civility, and any overly 
hasty equation of civic space with so- called open space, public space and the 
public sphere, such as those buildings, streets, squares, marketplaces, parks, gar-
dens, roundabouts, sports arenas, convention centres, monuments, cemeteries, 
zoos, newspaper letters pages, online chat rooms, television studios, community 
halls, swimming pools, polling booths, art galleries, public libraries, civic centres, 
etc. where “good” people— civic- minded people, the people of civil society— 
tend to gather together to voice their opinions, flex their muscles, vent their 
fury and generally make a spectacle of themselves: from the dutiful citizenry 
who profess their devotion to the state when periodically summoned to vote to 
the riotous mob hell- bent on destroying the existing order of things (Badiou, 
2008, 2012).
Recall that this word, civic, from classical Latin, civicus, originally denoted a 
military honour: a Roman citizen who had saved the life of a fellow Roman 
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citizen during warfare would be decorated with a crown, garland or wreath of oak 
leaves and acorns (corona civica). Only during the French Revolution, at the end 
of the eighteenth century, did this narrow usage significantly broaden, and it did 
so in two not entirely complementary directions: on the one hand, civic came to 
honour the citizen (civis) as such, a citizen no longer cast as a citizen soldier, but 
recast as an ordinary citizen, a civilian, although the distinction between the civil-
ian sphere and the military sphere is obviously liable to collapse (everything from 
paramilitary organisations, such as police forces, other so- called emergency services 
and scouting for boys and girls, to the mobilisation of entire populations to wage 
total war and the targeting of entire populations in the waging of wars of annihila-
tion and extermination); while, on the other hand, civic also came to honour the 
town and the city as such (civicus), specifically in the form of the urban, as a locality 
befitting and characteristic of a community of citizens, and as a locality adminis-
tered by a community of citizens— so- called civil authority, civilian authority or 
civilian government.
Just as we tend to forget that the legal form of a commercial company only 
ceased to be a company of living persons through a series of legal machinations in 
the second half of the nineteenth century that transformed the company itself into 
an artificial person (Neocleous, 2003)— a legal personification and subjectivation 
of capital with plenty of rights, especially property rights (to own, borrow, lend, 
sue, employ, suffer damages and even will), and hardly any serious responsibili-
ties (alas)— , so we tend to forget that the original form of a town or a city was 
a fellowship of citizens, which never accounted for all. We, the people, has always 
been a minority and sectarian affair. And while Roman citizenship remained ter-
ritorial, Athenian citizenship was “de- spatialised” and “de- territorialised”— leading 
“to a new kind of identity [for] the citizen, one based on political affiliation alone, 
on the citizen’s belonging to the polis that for the first time gave the citizen a 
civic presence in the city- state” (Gasché, 2014, p. 25). Uprooted and separated 
from every kind of identity and bond that had previously tethered them to one 
another, these newly forged citizens cast adrift in civic space had nothing in com-
mon except for their citizenship, a form of citizenship that has subsequently been 
re- territorialised onto everything from city states and nation states to the world at 
large and the planet as such.
The [Athenian] reform . . . consisted in a territorial reorganization of Attica 
on the basis of demes (demoi), that is, the smallest local unities of settlements 
such as townships that were given a political organization and that cut, as 
it were, through the old order of the phylai (tribes), gene (clans), phratriai 
(brotherhoods), and thiasoi (cult communities). These demes in turn were 
used to completely reconstitute and regroup the phylai such that they no 
longer represented particular, local interests. As a result of this reorgani-
zation, the civic body of Attica completely changed, now detached from 
the local solidarities that until then had cemented the regional factions. . . . 
[As] a consequence of the reorganization of the tribes and the admission of 
new citizens, such as nonnatives, freed slaves, and foreigners, the reform also 
brought about a mixing of citizens, one of its most striking aspects.
(Gasché, 2014, pp. 24– 25)
With the reassertion and broadening of the notion of the civic in the wake 
of the French Revolution, which bound together an honouring of the citizen, a 
veneration of the community of citizens and a glorification of government by the 
citizenry, all of which was elevated from the confines of the urban to the nation 
writ large and the universal figure of Man, every space and place, and every nook 
and cranny, became a civic concern. If the forums, agorae, colonnades, bathhouses, 
gymnasiums, theatres, amphitheatres, circuses and suchlike were the quintessen-
tial civic spaces of Antiquity, where citizens gathered together to do whatever 
citizens do (Sennett, 1996), then Modernity has levelled such spaces within what 
I am tempted to call a “civic sprawl”. For example, while television injects civic 
space into the fabric of the home, thereby de- differentiating public and private 
space, this can nevertheless be resisted. A wonderful instance of such resistance 
occurred in Poland in 1982, when residents of Swidnik made a public spectacle 
of their boycotting of the state’s news bulletins by either facing their switched- off 
television sets onto the street or else by taking their unplugged television sets out 
for an early evening stroll in pushchairs and wheelbarrows, thereby returning the 
audio- visual drone of the state whence it came (Crawshaw and Jackson, 2010). In 
this case, civic space belongs as much to the pushchairs and the wheelbarrows, the 
switched- off and unplugged television sets, and the living rooms and the window 
frames, as it does to the city’s streets, the public’s discourses and the broadcasting 
of the state. Indeed, if I were pressed to single out a few exemplary civic spaces of 
Modernity, then I would probably foreground barbed- wire enclosures, gas cham-
bers, electric chairs and guillotine scaffolds (Doel, 2017). (For just as the death 
penalty is arguably what is most properly “human”, not only because it is primar-
ily reserved for humans, but also because it places a value on the human that is 
worth more than life itself (Derrida, 2014), Dr Guillotin’s eponymous beheading 
machine is arguably the perfect citizen: egalitarian, enlightened and humane; and 
diametrically opposed to the inegalitarian, unenlightened and inhumane forms of 
spectacular execution in the Ancien Régime. The guillotine was conceived to be 
a civic- minded citizen fully at home and tirelessly at work in the civic centre of 
Paris.) But I will resist any such pressure, and simply say that the domain of civic 
space is illimitable and without taxonomic closure. Hereinafter, any space whatso-
ever may be qualified as civic— or not— , which brings me back to the matter of 
re- entering the burrow of civic spaces and desire by way of so many difference- 
producing ands and buts.
Let me start over again, then, with any heterogeneous assemblage whatsoever, 
such as windows and wheelbarrows, roundabouts and television sets, barbed wire 
and bunting, street furniture and wilted lettuce, cobblestones and submarine cables, 
sewerage and zoos, signage and anthems, lampposts and time zones, refuse and 
emissions, postage stamps and number plates, or even condiments and the police 
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(e.g. Arasse, 1991; Darnton, 2010; Moxham, 2001; Netz, 2009; Schivelbusch, 
1992; Sennett, 1996). Civic space would then no longer be grounded in a struc-
ture, least of all an infra- structure or a super- structure, but would instead be taken 
up as a machine. We would no longer ask “what is civic space?” but rather “what 
becomes of civic space?” And we would seek “not an essence or a position, but a 
tendency, an orientation- to- change” (Holland, 2013, p. 34), and these can only 
ever be discerned in context, in situ and au milieu, according to their lines of rigid 
(molar) and supple (molecular) segmentation, their lines of de- territorialisation 
and re- territorialisation, and their lines of flight and escape (Deleuze and Guat-
tari, 1986, 1988), and the drive of an “abstract machine, which does not exist but 
only becomes, which is never fully emerged, but only ever in emergence, [and] is 
always subject to . . . counter actualisation” (Dowd, 2007, p. 14, italics in original). 
Indeed, I recall Derrida’s (1989, p. 73) characterisation of deconstruction as “a 
suspicion directed against just that kind of thinking— ‘what is . . .?’ ”, a suspicion 
that Deleuze shared:
The Idea responds only to the call of certain questions. Platonism has 
determined the Idea’s form of question as What is X? This noble question 
is supposed to concern the essence and is opposed to vulgar questions 
which point merely to the example or the accident. So, we do not ask 
who or what is beautiful, but what is the Beautiful. It is not where and when 
does justice exist, but what is the Just. . . . And yet the privilege accorded 
the question What is this? reveals itself to be confused and doubtful, even 
in Platonism and the Platonic tradition. . . . And when we examine the 
history of philosophy as a whole, we will have a tough time discover-
ing any philosopher whose research was guided by the question What 
is this? . . . The question What is this? . . . includes the inessential, and 
includes it in essence, and thus contradicts itself. Another way of going 
about it . . . [approaches] the Idea as a multiplicity. . . . “[M]ultiplicity” 
when used as a substantive, designates a domain where the Idea, of itself, 
is much closer to the accident than to the abstract essence, and can be 
determined only with the questions who? how? how much? where and when? 
in which case?— forms that sketch the genuine spatio- temporal coordinates 
of the Idea.
(Deleuze, 2004, pp. 95– 96, italics in original)
Civic spaces and desire should be regarded not as the conjoining of two dis-
tinct essences or discrete positions, or the synthesis of two independent structures 
or separate systems, which may or may not occupy the same level of the socio- 
spatial formation, depending on whether or not desire is regarded as infra- structural 
(energetic, vitalistic, libidinal, etc.) and civic spaces as super- structural (expressive, 
symbolic, ideological, etc.) or vice versa, but as a burrow, a rhizome, an assem-
blage, a multiplicity and a machine. Asking “which one?” rather than “what is?” 
basically “means this: what are the forces which take hold of a given thing, what 
is the will that possesses it? Which one is expressed, manifested and even hidden 
in it?” (Deleuze, 1986, p. 71). Asking “what is?” expresses a mode of question-
ing that draws upon the long- standing complicity between testing, torture and 
truth (Ronnell, 2005); an inquisitorial mode of questioning that seeks to draw out 
essence from appearance, an essence that is always already given: pre- formed and 
pre- fabricated.
When I ask what is this?, I assume there is an essence behind appearances, 
or at least something ultimate behind the masks. The other kind of ques-
tion, however, always discovers other masks behind the mask, displacements 
behind every place, other “cases” stacked up in a case.
(Deleuze, 2004, p. 114, italics in original)
By contrast, asking “which one?” expresses a mode of questioning that opens 
onto the outside, the forces that traverse it and the problematics that transform it; 
“never ‘What is it?’ (the question of being), but ‘In which direction is it going?’ 
‘How fast?’ ‘Along with what else?’ ” (Holland, 2013, p. 35). So, we will ask of 
civic space and desire neither what each is nor what each means, but rather what 
becomes of them. For example, what becomes of a police officer, a demonstrator 
and a Molotov cocktail that come to engage one another on a dimly lit street 
corner? Echoing Marx’s oft- quoted eleventh thesis on Ludwig Feuerbach— “The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, 
is to change it” (Marx, 1946, p. 65, italics in original)— , it is a question of opening 
them up to the outside, to the conjunctures and encounters that make them act, 
function and work otherwise: and . . . and . . . and . . . but . . . but . . . but. “There 
is nothing to explain, nothing to understand, nothing to interpret” (Deleuze, 1977, 
p. 114). We will enter the fray, then, from the side of the machine, from the side 
of production, fabrication and manufacture. This is how one becomes engaged.
The question should certainly not be: What is a machine? Or even: Who is 
a machine? It is not a question of the essence, but of the event, not about 
is, but about and, about concatenations and connections, compositions and 
movements that constitute a machine.
(Raunig, 2010, p. 19, italics in original)
Now that we have decided to enter civic space and desire from the side of 
the machine and engagement, where better so to do than via the opening lines 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti- Oedipus, penned under the surtitle “the desiring- 
machines”, and the subtitle “desiring- production”.
It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in 
fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks. What a mis-
take to have ever said the Id. Everywhere it is machines— real ones, not 
figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by 
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other machines, with all the necessary couplings and connections. An organ- 
machine is plugged into an energy- source- machine: the one produces a flow 
that the other interrupts.
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 1, italics in original)
For example, suckling and defecating are machinic: a breast is plugged into a 
mouth and an anal canal is plugged into a rectum, with nourishment and anxiety 
traversing the former, and faeces and gifts traversing the latter. “ ‘Being- for- the- 
machine’, that is desire. Not being- for- the- other in general. What an idea!” (Guat-
tari, 2006, p. 184). Likewise for labouring and revolting: a working body is plugged 
into a body of capital and a nobody is plugged into an uprising, with use- values and 
exchange- values traversing the former, and justice and fidelity traversing the latter. 
And when they are all plugged back into civic space they come to concern so- 
called public health, public decency, public order, public opinion, public policy, 
public interest, etc. More and more flows, more and more interruptions, inter-
secting and bisecting, smoothing and striating, splicing and splaying, producing 
and seducing. Here as elsewhere, “there is no desire other than assembled [agencé] 
desire” (Smith, 2012, p. 322).
Desiring- machines are binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of rules gov-
erning associations: one machine is always coupled with another. The produc-
tive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently connective in nature: 
“and . . .” “and then . . .” This is because there is always a flow- producing 
machine, and another machine connected to it that interrupts or draws off part 
of this flow (the breast— the mouth). And because the first machine is in turn 
connected to another whose flow it interrupts or partially drains off, the binary 
series is linear in every direction. Desire constantly couples continuous flows 
and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and fragmented. Desire causes 
the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows.
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1984, p. 5)
Given that “there are Flows; the world presents itself in the form of fluctuation” 
(Guattari, 2013, p. 75), and so we will enter any civic space whatsoever by way 
of the energy- source- machines and the organ- machines that connect, disconnect 
and reconnect with one another to produce the flows and interruptions that will 
have lent it consistency. Recall, for example, that Le Corbusier’s City of Tomor-
row has civic- centre railway stations that interrupt the flow of passengers from the 
suburbs, and that in turn produce a flow of workers through its vomitories that 
the sky- scrapers interrupt. Here as elsewhere, “the system is demented, yet works 
very well” (Deleuze, in Guattari, 2009, p. 36). Whether it is civic space or desire, 
it is an assembly of machines. Such is the world, or, better yet, the “chaosmos”, of 
flow and interruption: and . . . and . . . and . . . but . . . but . . . but . . . “an infernal 
machine is being assembled” (Guattari, 1984, p. 115), a machinic assemblage that 
emphasises the consistency of becoming rather than the existence of being: “to 
ex- ist is to stand out” whereas “to con- sist entails being- with rather than standing- 
out: togetherness, the multiple logics of ‘and’ and ‘with’ rather than the singular 
logic of being” (Holland, 2013, p. 11).
We will have entered civic space, then, from the side of the machine and pro-
duction rather than from the side of the spectacle and reproduction, and specifically 
from the side of the machinic- cum- schizoanalytic unconscious (Guattari, 2011, 2013), 
as distinct from both the psychoanalytic unconscious, where everything is “played out 
in advance, every possible path marked out: the psychoanalytic unconscious was 
programmed like destiny” (Guattari, 1986, p. 196), and the structural unconscious, 
where the “sign under erasure” (Nancy and Lacoue- Labarthe, 1992, p. 39) and 
“the plague of the signifier” (Guattari, 2013, p. 256) run amok. “I call it ‘machinic’ 
because it is not necessarily centered around human subjectivity, but involves the 
most diverse material fluxes and social systems” (Guattari, 1986, p. 194). The 
unconscious is not a personal, individual or even family drama, but a collective 
“production of the real, not merely of representation” (Land, 2011, p. 321), and it 
is not simply a human production, but one that takes in anything and everything: 
animal, vegetable, mineral, etc. For instance, the entire fabric of the city is bound 
up with dream- work: not just bedrooms and bathrooms, cinemas and stores, but 
also bicycles and bar stools, chimneys and subways, razor wire and telegraph poles. 
“Dissociate subjectivity from the subject, from the individual, and even from the 
human, and cease considering the power of enunciation exclusive to man and 
subjectivity” (Lazzarato, 2014, p. 62). Take the gay chatter of commodities in the 
arcades of Paris, for example, which is oblivious to the presence of consumers, or 
even the traffic- calming power of a solitary sleeping policeman. A subject is not 
there from the start, as a foundation or an origin or a cause of desire, but is pro-
duced by the machinic unconscious through modes of subjectivation and individu-
ation as an after- effect. “Actually, there is no ‘subject of desire’, only a production 
of desire according to a sign machine” (Guattari, 2006, p. 100, italics in original).
We believe the unconscious is not a theatre, but a factory. . . . Saying the 
unconscious “produces” means that it’s a kind of mechanism that produces 
other mechanisms. In other words, we believe the unconscious has noth-
ing in common with theatrical representation, but with something called 
a “desiring- machine”. . . . Desiring consists in interruptions, letting certain 
flows through, making withdrawals from those flows, cutting the chains that 
become attached to the flows. . . . and contrary to what traditional psychoa-
nalysis tells us, it is perfectly meaningless. Without any sense, there is nothing 
to interpret. . . . The problem is knowing how the unconscious works. It 
is knowing how “desiring- machines” work, and knowing how to use those 
machines.
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, p. 232)
We will not, then, enter civic space by way of the customary routes, such as 
city gates and railway stations, boulevards and promenades, toponyms and statues, 
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or URLs and hashtags, nor by way of the customary keywords, such as citizenship, 
nationalism, democracy or community, all of which presuppose and reinforce the 
existence of some “one” that is bound together by force and machination, nor 
by way of the customary activities, such as professing, communing, commuting, 
demonstrating or protesting, none of which are especially or peculiarly civic, but 
by way of desiring- machines, desiring- production, and their flows and interrup-
tions: and . . . and . . . and . . . but . . . but . . . but. This heterogeneous assemblage 
works, and it works by perpetually breaking down and leaking in all directions. 
Hereinafter, we will never have pinned or penned down civic space (— and desire), 
least of all by severing the machinic connections, by guillotining the subject and 
the object cause of desire, by jamming the concrete and abstract machines, and 
by proclaiming: “You will be a body— corpse— body— a cadaver, not a machine” 
(Guattari, 2006, p. 291, italics in original). The city drones on and on.
One will never be done with machinic deterritorialization! It escapes from 
ordinary laws, hierarchies and metrics. There is no initial state or terminal 
state with it. . . . It is becoming processualizing itself, the heterogeneous in 
the process of differentiating itself.
(Guattari, 2013, p. 94)
Having entered civic space by way of the gutter, and having lost my way in 
the labyrinthine garden of forking paths in the civic centre, I will take my leave 
of this ignoble necropolis in the customary way, by exiting through the gift shop, 
with a pretty tea towel, a kitsch snow globe and a second- hand jigsaw puzzle 
expertly crafted by Gaspard Winckler for a certain Mr Bartlebooth of 11 Rue 
Simon- Crubellier, Plaine Monceau, Paris XVII, which came with an enigmatic 
handwritten note:
It is the twenty- third of June nineteen seventy- five, and it is eight o’clock 
in the evening. Seated at his jigsaw puzzle, Bartlebooth has just died. On 
the tablecloth, somewhere in the crepuscular sky of the four hundred and 
thirty- ninth puzzle, the black hole of the sole piece not yet filled in has the 
almost perfect shape of an X. But the ironical thing, which could have been 
foreseen long ago, is that the piece the dead man holds between his fingers 
is shaped like a W.
(Perec, 1996, p. 497)
And so, when all is said and done, if an X were to mark the spot where civic 
space always already founders on the machinic assembly of desire, then a certain 
W may at least come to serve as the vector by way of which other machinations 
of desiring- production take flight (Guattari, 2015, 2016). This W is perhaps best 
illustrated not by the likes of Le Corbusier’s (1947) City of Tomorrow, and its pro-
clivity for straight lines, right angles and crosses, but by Chris Ware’s (2012) Build-
ing Stories— for which “some assembly” is obviously required (Doel, 2014; Doel 
and Clarke, 2009)— or, better still, by Perec’s own W, or the Memory of Childhood 
(1988), a story of parallel (and parallax) lives in which “almost every assertion in 
the memory chapters . . . asks to be questioned, and the answer in most cases is that 
the memory . . . has been altered, reworked, decorated or, more plainly, falsified” 
(Bellos, 1999, p. 548). The letter W began life as a ligatured doubling of the letters 
U and V, a “double U” that graphically recalls the deconstructive play of difference 
and repetition, reversal and reinscription, and displacement and duplicity— the dif-
férance of the eternal return that splays out and hollows out: and . . . and . . . and . . . 
but . . . but . . . but. In other words, W marks the spot where X deconstructs and V 
takes flight (Pynchon, 1963). Hereinafter, civic space and desire scatter. . . .
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